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SURVEY
State High Courts, State Constitutions,
and Individual Rights Litigation Since
1980: A Judicial Survey*
By

RONALD

K.L.

COLLINS**

PETER J. GALiE***
JOHN KINCAID****

Introduction
A growing number of state high courts have been construing their
own constitutions in a way recognizing "greater" protection for individual rights claims than has been recognized by the United States Supreme
Court in interpreting the federal Constitution. This development may
be, as Associate Justice William Brennan has noted, "the most important

development in constitutional jurisprudence of our times."'
The numerous state cases, in turn, have produced an even larger
body of commentary on the topic of state constitutions. By the latest
count, over three hundred such articles have been published since 1970
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1. Quoted in NAT'L L. J., Sept. 29, 1986 (Special Supplement). See also Brennan, State
Constitutionsand the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 495 (1977).
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alone.2 What has not been explored are the reactions of state judges to
this trend. In this article we offer some information on the various perceptions and reactions of judges sitting on high courts to this relatively
new development concerning the law of individual rights.
Since the early 1970's, state courts of last resort have issued a growing number of decisions in which provisions of state constitutions have
served either as independent grounds or as the only grounds for ruling on
questions of individual rights and liberties. A benchmark year in the
revival of judicial attention to state declarations and bills of rights was
1977. In that year, Justice William Brennan of the United States
Supreme Court urged state courts to look to their state constitutions as a
way of affording citizens' rights protections beyond those recognized by
United States Supreme Court interpretations of the United States Constitution.3 Although Justice Brennan based his article in part on signs of a
new judicial trend already evident in several states, the pace of that trend
picked up after 1977. 4 Since 1977 alone, state high courts have rendered
at least 217 rights-affirming decisions based upon provisions of their state
constitutions-approximately a 131 percent increase in the number of
such decisions over the ninety-four decisions issued during 1950-1977.'
Some forty-six such decisions were handed down in 1985, the highest
2. Collins & Galie, Cases & Commentary on State Constitutions, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 29,
1986 (Special Supplement) [hereinafter cited as Collins & Galie, Commentary]. See infra note
7.
3. Brennan, supra note 1. The key ideas expressed in Justice Brennan's article had been
set forth earlier by other commentators. See, e.g., Countryman, Why a State Bill ofRights? 45
WASH. L. REV. 454 (1970); Force, State 'Bills ofRights': A Case ofNeglect and the Needfor a
Renaissance, 3 VAL. U.L. REV. 125 (1969); Linde, Without 'Due Process': Unconstitutional
Law in Oregon, 49 OR. L. REV. 125 (1970).
4. See infra Table L
5. The 311 decisions (mostly post-1970) are identified in Collins & Galie, Commentary,
supra note 2. The decisions are those in which state high courts announced "greater" rights
protection to individuals under their state constitutions than is otherwise granted by the
United States Supreme Court in interpreting the United States Constitution, or in which state
high courts based their decisions affirming rights solely on state constitutional grounds. We
believe that these 311 decisions accurately represent the vast majority of such decisions for the
1950-1985 period. Such decisions are not easy to locate because, among other things, they are
not always clearly identified in the standard reporting sources; therefore, a possibility of an
undercount exists, especially for the 1950-1969 period. However, if an undercount does in fact
exist, we do not believe that an identification of any additional decisions would significantly
alter the findings presented infra in Tables 1, 3, 4, and 5. It should also be noted that, in a
relatively few instances, state high courts have denied a state constitutional rights claim while,
nevertheless, announcing a level of constitutional protection greater than that recognized by
the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 99 N.J. 552, 494 A.2d
294 (1985); State v. Kennedy, 295 Or. 260, 666 P.2d 1316 (1983). The number of cases cited
here is also the product of changes in litigation trends as much as of changes in the methods of
state court decisonmaking. Finally, data for 1986 are incomplete at this time.
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recorded number for any single year. 6 As noted, law reviews around the
country have published a multitude of articles on individual rights litigation under state constitutions.7
TABLE 1
Number of Independent State Constitutional Rights Decisions Since 1950 a
Years
1950-1959
1960-1969
1970-1974
1975-1979
1980-1984
1985-1986
Total

Number
3
7
36
88
125
52
311

Percent of Total
1
2
12
28
40
17
100

' See footnote 5.
Measuring the level and geographic spread of rights litigation premised upon state constitutional law is not easy. For example, while it is
possible to examine the number of state court individual rights decisions
based upon state constitutional grounds, records are not ordinarily kept
on the number and type of cases in which state constitutional questions
were raised initially. To measure the level and distribution of state constitutional litigation in individual rights cases in a preliminary way, in
early 1986 we conducted a survey of state high court justices and judges.
A brief questionnaire was mailed to the fifty-two chief justices of the nation's state courts of last resort and to one randomly selected associate
justice from each of those courts.8 A follow-up questionnaire was sent to
the initial non-respondents. Usable responses were received from thirtyseven chief justices and twenty-eight associate justices representing fortyone of the fifty states.9 The regional distribution of responses closely approximates the regional distribution of the states. The total response rate
was sixty-three percent. Nearly all respondents answered all questions.
6. The 1985 cases are discussed in Collins & Galie, Models of Post-IncorporationJudicial
Review: 1985 Survey of State ConstitutionalIndividual Rights Decisions, 16 PUBLIUS: J. OF
FEDERALISM 111 (Summer 1986), reprinted in 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 317 (1986).
7. See Collins & Galie, Commentary,supra note 2. This compilation contains over three
hundred and fifty articles or monographs on the topic of state constitutional law and individual
rights. See also Symposium on State ConstitutionalLaw, 63 TEx. L. REV. 959-1375 (1985).
8. There are fifty-two courts because Oklahoma and Texas have two high courts each, a
supreme court and a court of criminal appeals. For the sake of economy, we will refer to all
respondents as "justices" even though high court members in some states are called "judges."
9. No responses were received from justices in Illinois, Kansas, Michigan, Mississippi,
Missouri, Nevada, South Dakota, Virginia, and Wyoming.
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It is important to note that the survey results reflect the perceptions
of justices concerning activity in the area of state constitutional law litigation in individual rights cases in their states. Several justices reported
that they did not wish to respond to the questionnaire because they did
not have data on such litigation. Also, in a few cases, respondents from
the same court had different perceptions of the level and nature of state
constitutional law litigation in individual rights cases brought before
their court. In part, such differences may have been due to the fact that
we provided a fairly wide range of responses for each question so that
justices could find a response that would best reflect their perception of
litigation activity.
I.

Increases and Frequencies of State Constitutional
Rights Litigation

The data displayed in Table 2 show that slightly more than threequarters of the responding state high court justices perceive an increase
in the number of individual rights cases litigated under their state constitution since 1980. Generally, the perceptions of the justices coincide
with the data presented in Table 1. Of the justices who reported an increase since 1980, thirty-three percent reported a significant increase,
thirty-four percent reported a moderate increase, and thirty-three percent reported a slight increase. Interestingly, associate justices in all regions except the Midwest were more likely to report significant-tomoderate increases in state constitutional law litigation than were chief
justices, fifty-eight percent and forty-two percent respectively.
TABLE 2
Perceptions of Change in State Constitutional Rights Litigation
Since 1980
Has there been an increase in the number of individual rights
cases litigated under the state constitution since 1980?
Response
Significant increase
Moderate increase
Slight increase
No increase
Decrease
Total

Percent

Number

25
27
25
23
0
100

16
17
16
15
0
64
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In the absence of survey data prior to 1980, we cannot be certain
about the meaning or strength of the trend suggested by these survey
results. A court that had experienced a significant increase in state constitutional rights litigation during the 1970's might report a smaller increase during the 1980's. For example, in 1977, Justice Brennan cited
the Supreme Court of New Jersey for its activity in the field of rights
litigation under its state constitution. ° Survey responses from that
court, however, indicated only a moderate increase in such litigation
since 1980. Similarly, the Supreme Court of California reported no increase in state constitutional rights litigation since 1980. Most likely,
this response is due to the fact that the California court was already active in this field before 1980. In fact, of the 311 actual rights-affirming
decisions based on state constitutional law grounds rendered by state
high courts, the California court, with forty-one such decisions, is the
nation's leading court. Furthermore, the survey responses from California indicate that state constitutional claims are raised in an unusually
high proportion, approximately fifty to seventy-four percent of all rights
cases brought before the supreme court. Hence, a response of "no increase" does not always signify an absence or a paucity of state constitutional law litigation in individual rights cases.
Nonetheless, considering the increase in the number of rights-affirming cases actually decided on state constitutional law grounds since
1980, it is reasonable to suggest that the survey results also point to a
marked increase, though not yet a "revolution," in litigation based upon
rights protections contained in state constitutions. Justice Harry C. Martin of the Supreme Court of North Carolina captured the tone of the
overall survey results in a comment he wrote on his questionnaire:
"State constitutional law is being relied upon more frequently. As lawyers become more familiar with it, state constitutional law will no longer
be 'The Forgotten Evil.'" Indeed, no survey respondent reported a decrease in the number of individual rights cases litigated under his or her
state constitution since 1980.
In most states, however, state constitutional claims are raised less
frequently than federal constitutional claims in individual rights cases.
Nearly two-thirds' 1 of the respondents reported that state constitutional
claims are raised less frequently than federal constitutional claims in
such cases. Chief justices, however, were more likely to give this response than were associate justices, fifty-nine percent and forty-two percent respectively. One-quarter of the respondents replied that both state
10. Brennan, supra note 1, at 499.
11. Sixty-six percent.
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and federal constitutional claims are raised with the same frequency in
individual rights cases. Only ten percent of the respondents reported
that state claims are raised more frequently than federal claims.12
A survey comment from Justice Frank B. Morrison of Montana
suggests one reason why state constitutional law claims are raised frequently in Montana:
During the years I have been a Montana Supreme Court Justice, I
have become more interested in developing the area of law known
as "independent state grounds." The new Montana Constitution
adopted in 1972 is a rather unique document and provides a basis
for considerable departure from federal precedent. This has been
particularly true in the civil area where we have developed a new
equal protection law relying upon the implication of fundamental
rights declared in our State Constitution and requiring a showing
13
of a compelling state interest to justify legislative discrimination.
We did not ask justices for the reasons why state constitutional issues are raised or not raised in cases brought before their courts, but
comments from two other justices suggest why state constitutional issues
are often raised less frequently than federal constitutional issues. Justice
Arthur A. M'Guieriu of the Supreme Court of Iowa commented:
Most practicing and appellate lawyers in Iowa, especially those not
recently out of law school, pay little attention to the provisions of
the Iowa Constitution. Their constitutional thoughts focus more
on the United States Constitution. A provision of the Iowa Constitution is usually raised, if at all, in conjunction with a provision of
the United States Constitution on an equal protection or due process question.
Justice Christine M. Durham of the Supreme Court of Utah expressed
"dismay" at "the continuing failure of counsel to raise and brief state
constitutional claims. I expect that our Court will be increasingly willing
to require supplemental briefing and/or to treat such claims sua sponte if
this practice does not change." 14 By comparison, Justice Ernest W. Gibson of the Supreme Court of Vermont sounded a cautionary note: "I
view state constitutions as a safety net and would hope that the fifty
states do not go charging off in all directions simply because it has become a fad to cite the local constitutions."
12. The states represented in this category were Alaska, Montana, Rhode Island, Utah,
and Wisconsin.
13. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 719 P.2d 771 (Mont. 1986). But cf, Collins, Reliance on
State Constitutions-The Montana Disaster, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1095 (1985).
14. See also, Justice Durham's majority opinion to the same effect in State v. Earl, 716
P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1986); Durham, Fillinga Scholarly Void, NAT'L. L. J.,Sept. 29, 1986
(Special Supplement), at 6.
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II. Variations in Activity
The high courts in the fifty states have not all charged down the
state constitutional law path in the field of individual rights protection.
Some state courts have virtually no recent record in this area, others have
a substantial record, and still others turn to their state constitution on a
selective basis.
A.

Region

There are noticeable regional differences in the degree to which state
constitutional law litigation in individual rights cases has increased in
different states since 1980. The data displayed in Table 3 show a Ushape, regional distribution. Respondents from both the Northeast and
the West reported greater increases in the number of individual rights
cases litigated under their state constitutions since 1980 than did respondents from the Midwest and South.
TABLE 3
Perceptions of State Constitutional Rights Litigation By Region
Percent of Respondents
Response
Significant
increase
Moderate
increase
Slight
increase
No increase
Total number
Percent of 311
actual cases
decided since
1950
a

Northeast

Midwest

South

West

73

0

5

24

20

27

29

29

7
0
15

45
27
11

24
43
21

29
18
17

[26]

[7]

[16]a

[51]

West Virginia, a border state, accounts for twenty-eight
percent (or fourteen) of the actual state constitutional rightsaffirming decisions in the South.

Nearly all o the high courts in the Northeast 15 have experienced
significant-to-moderate increases in state constitutional law litigation in
15. The Northeast consists of the New England states as well as New York, New Jersey,
and Pennsylvania.
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individual rights cases since 1980. In the West, the greatest increases in
state constitutional law litigation since 1980 occurred in Montana, Oregon, and Washington. Moderate increases occurred in Alaska, Arizona,
Colorado, and Utah. 6
The data displayed in Table 3 conform fairly well to the regional
distribution of rights-affirming cases actually decided since 1950. The
percentages in the bottom row of the table are based upon the 311 cases
decided since 1950 in which state high courts granted greater rights protection to individuals under their state constitution than that granted
under United States Supreme Court interpretations of the United States
Constitution, or in which state high courts based their decisions affirming
rights solely on state constitutional grounds. Again, there is the same Ushape pattern. State courts in the Northeast and in the West account for
the lion's share, seventy-seven percent, of such decisions grounded in
state constitutional law.
Respondents from the West, however, were much more likely to report that state constitutional issues are raised with greater frequency
than, or the same frequency as, federal constitutional issues in individual
rights cases. Fully fifty-five percent of the western respondents reported
such frequencies, while only twenty-nine percent of the respondents from
the Northeast and eighteen percent from the Midwest reported such frequencies. No respondent from the South reported that state constitutional claims are raised more frequently than federal constitutional
claims in individual rights cases, although twenty-nine percent of the
southern respondents did report that state constitutional issues are raised
with the same frequency as federal constitutional issues. In light of the
South's historic concern for state sovereignty, one might have expected
southern high courts to welcome the opportunity to base constitutional
decisions upon state law. However, because of a number of possible factors, such as conventional litigation practices and the South's historic
record in the field of individual rights protection, the development of
16. The only state court response that fell outside this regional pattern was that of Kentucky. A significant increase in state constitutional law litigation was reported from the
Supreme Court of Kentucky. However, only one justice responded from Kentucky, and the
questionnaire was incomplete. Furthermore, we have been able to identify only two
noneconomic, state constitutional rights-affirming decisions issued by the Supreme Court of
Kentucky. Therefore, in the absence of additional information, the Kentucky response ought
to be viewed with caution, although we have included the response in all data tabulations. If
Kentucky were to be deleted from Table 3, the percentages for the South would be as follows:
significant increase (0), moderate increase (30), slight increase (25), and no increase (45). Similarly, if Kentucky were deleted from the traditionalistic category in Table 4, the percentages
would be: significant increase (0), moderate increase (35), slight increase (20), and no increase
(45).
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state constitutional rights law has yet to occur on a widespread basis in
the South.
B. Political Culture
The regional distributions of both survey responses and actual case
decisions suggest that variations in state constitutional law litigation in
individual rights cases may also be associated with political culture. 7
Daniel J. Elazar has suggested that American political culture reflects three constituent subcultures: individualistic, moralistic, and traditionalistic. 8 Politics in the individualistic political culture tends to be
viewed as a means for advancing private interests rather than public principles. The role of government is to keep the political "marketplace" in
working order but not, for the most part, to initiate new programs or
policies unless there is a strong demand for such action from the general
public or powerful interest groups. By contrast, politics in the moralistic
political culture tends to be viewed as a principled and communitarian
search for the good of the "commonwealth." The role of government is
to help foster social and economic welfare and to initiate action, where
necessary, to promote principles associated with the public interest. Politics in the traditionalistic political culture, however, tends to be viewed as
a means for maintaining hierarchial social structures and traditional
ways of life rooted historically in precommercial, organic conceptions of
the social order. The role of government is to perpetuate the interests of
elite groups, not to promote principles of general public interest or to
maintain a political marketplace reasonably open to anyone who wants
to get in on the game.
In light of the orientations of these subcultures, one would expect
respondents from states having a moralistic political culture to report
greater increases in state constitutional law litigation in individual rights
cases than those reported by respondents from states having a traditionalistic political culture. One would, in turn, expect responses from justices in individualistic states to fall between the responses of justices from
moralistic and traditionalistic states. Such a pattern can be observed, for
example, in state ratifications of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment
to the United States Constitution. The amendment was ratified by
ninety-four percent' 9 of the moralistic states, eighty-two percent of the
17. See also Caldeira, The Transmission of Legal Precedent: A Study of State Supreme
Courts, 79 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 178, 187-88 (March 1985).
18. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES 110-42 (3d ed.
1984).
19. All but Utah.
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individualistic states, and only thirty-one percent of the traditionalistic
states.2 o
The data displayed in Table 4 show that respondents from moralistic states were more likely to report significant increases in state constitutional law litigation in individual rights cases since 1980 than were
respondents from both traditionalistic and individualistic states. In turn,
respondents from individualistic states were more likely to report moderate-to-significant increases in state constitutional law litigation since 1980
than were respondents from traditionalistic states. Like Table 3, the bottom row of Table 4 shows the percentage distribution by political culture
on the 311 actual rights-affirming cases decided since 1950. The distribution of these cases conforms nicely to the survey results. High courts in
the moralistic states account for half of the 311 rights-affirming cases
decided on state constitutional grounds since 1950.
TABLE 4
Perceptions of State Constitutional Rights Litigation By Political Culture

Response
Significant
increase
Moderate
increase
Slight increase
No increase
Total number
Percent of
311 actual
cases decided
since 1950

Moralistic

Percent of Respondents
Traditionalistic
Individualistic

42

26

5

17
29
13
24

32
26
16
19

33
19
43
21

[51]

[34]

[15] a

West Virginia accounts for twenty-nine percent of the actual
state constitutional rights-affirming decisions among
traditionalistic states.
Similar results were obtained on the question of whether state constitutional issues are raised more or less frequently than federal constitutional issues in individual rights cases. Nearly half2" of the respondents
from moralistic states and thirty-three percent of the respondents from
20. Kincaid, Dimensions and Effects of America's Political Cultures, 5 J. AM. CULTURE
84, 87-88 (Fall 1982).
21. Forty-eight percent.
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individualistic states reported that state constitutional issues are raised
with greater frequency than, or the same frequency as, federal constitutional issues. No respondent from a traditionalistic state reported that
state constitutional issues are raised with greater frequency, and only
nineteen percent reported that state constitutional issues are raised with
the same frequency as federal constitutional issues in individual rights
cases.
The political culture findings are more theoretically appealing than
the regional findings because political culture provides a conceptual
bridge that links similarly active courts which are otherwise a continent
apart. The bridge is the moralistic political culture, or strong elements
thereof, characteristic of many states in the Northeast2" and states in the
West2 3 where state high courts have experienced significant increases in
state constitutional law litigation in individual rights cases since 1980.
Hence, the U-shape pattern for regional variations disappears when we
consider variations by political culture.
It would appear, then, that increases in such litigation since 1980
reflect more than an ideological disposition that encourages attorneys or
courts to try to go beyond United States Supreme Court protections of
rights,2 4 and more than a simple geographic proximity that encourages a
regional diffusion of constitutional ideas. State political cultural orientations toward government and politics in general seem to play a role as
well. Indications of such cultural orientations can be seen in narrative
comments on the survey provided by justices from Washington and
Georgia. Chief Justice James M. Dolliver of the Supreme Court of
Washington wrote:
In the last ten years, the Washington Court has begun to analyze
seriously the meaning of our state constitution's Declaration of
Rights. Counsel are now regularly arguing our Declaration of
Rights and are also beginning to provide some assistance to the
Court by doing more than just pointing out the differences in language [between the state Declaration of Rights and the United
States Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment] of which the
Court is already aware.
Justice George T. Smith of the Supreme Court of Georgia wrote:
The Supreme Court of Georgia does not favor the use of State Constitutional law in view of the fact that in the criminal law field
especially, the State Constitution gives the individual more protec22. E.g., Vermont.
23. E.g., Oregon.
24. Of course, for some attorneys, particularly criminal defense lawyers, resort to state
constitutional law is primarily a litigation strategy employed in an attempt to obtain a result
not available under federal law.
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tion than does the Federal. The field of free speech is the only field
in which our Court follows the State Constitution, and it is more
protective than the Federal. Strangely enough, lawyers in the state
have not realized that you can depend upon the State Constitution
rather than the Federal. If they did, we would have some interesting opinions coming from our Supreme Court in its effort to ignore
the more protective State Constitution.
C. Method of Selection
One might also expect that responses could vary with the method of
selection of state high court justices. Courts whose justices are linked
closely to voters through direct elections to the court might be expected
to exhibit less activity in the field of state constitutional rights litigation
than courts whose justices are not linked closely, or linked at all, to voters. Voter perceptions of judicial leniency in the area of individual rights,
especially criminal rights in the public opinion climate of the 1980's,
might restrain the activity of elected justices. This is not to say that
members of a court can control the nature and frequency of state constitutional rights litigation. A motivated state bar can bring state constitutional rights claims to a court whether or not the court welcomes those
claims. The actions of attorneys, of course, affect the decisionmaking
process. Still, justices on the courts do give cues as to how receptive they
are to entertaining such claims. Members of the high courts in California, Oregon, Washington, Montana, Utah, New Hampshire, Maine, and
Vermont, for example, have given clear signals to attorneys that they will
give serious consideration to state constitutional rights claims.25 Consequently, one might expect methods of selection to have an effect on such
judicial cue giving. To help test this proposition, responses from states
were divided into three categories: (1) states having direct, partisan and
nonpartisan election of justices to the high court; (2) states having a system of appointment followed at some point by a public "retention" vote;
and (3) states having systems of appointment by the governor and the
26
legislature or both.
25. See, e.g., State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233, 238 (Vt. 1985); State v. Ball, 471 A.2d 336,
350-51 (N.H. 1983); State v. Cadman, 476 A.2d 1148 (Me. 1984); State v. Coe, 679 P.2d 353,
359 (Wash. 1984); Hewitt v. State Accident Ins. Fund Corp., 643 P.2d 970, 975 (Or. 1982);
People v. Brisedine, 531 P.2d 1099, 1113-14 (Cal. 1975); State v. Pitsch, 369 N.W.2d 711 (vis.
1985); Pfost v. State, 713 P.2d 495, 500-01 (Mont. 1985); see supra note 14.
26. Data on methods of selection were obtained from COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES, 1984-85 (1984). States in the first category may include
justices who first came to the court by appointment to fill a vacancy, but they must (or must
have) run against an opponent in the next judicial election. In states in the second category,
justices can only reach the court by appointment. After being appointed to the court, they
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The data displayed in Table 5 show expected and unexpected results. Justices from courts for which the method of selection is appointment were much more likely than other respondents to report a
significant increase in the number of individual rights cases litigated
under their state constitution since 1980. However, respondents from
courts for which the method of selection is direct election were the next
most likely to report a significant increase in such state constitutional law
litigation since 1980. Another apparent anomaly is that, in this table, the
percentage distribution of actual rights cases decided on state constitutional grounds since 1950 does not conform to the survey results.
TABLE 5
Perceptions of State Constitutional Rights Litigation
By Method of Selection

Response
Significant
increase
Moderate
increase
Slight increase
No increase
Total number
Percent of
311 actual
cases decided
since 1950

Election

Percent of Respondents
Appoint/Elect
Appointment

19

0

56

31
28
22
32

29
36
36
14

17
11
17
18

[46]

[32]

[22]

A different and unexpected pattern emerged on the question of
whether state constitutional claims are raised with greater or lesser frequency than federal constitutional claims. The differences were not
strong, but justices from courts whose members are elected to the court
were slightly more likely than other justices to report that state constitutional claims are raised more frequently than federal constitutional
claims. Justices who were appointed to their courts were slightly less
likely than other respondents to report such a situation.
If one controls for political culture by examining the relationship
between method of selection and survey responses within each political
subculture, then the relationship between method of selection and level
must appear on the ballot for a retention vote by the public. In such a retention election, the
justice "runs" on his or her judicial record and does not face an opponent for his or her seat.
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of increase in state constitutional rights litigation disappears among respondents from individualistic and traditionalistic states. Among moralistic states, however, all of the appointed respondents, thirty-one percent
of the elected respondents, and none of the other respondents reported a
significant increase in the number of individual rights cases litigated
under their state constitution since 1980.
The findings for method of selection appear to reflect the regional
history of state constitutional law litigation in individual rights cases
more than they do methods of selection per se. That is, such litigation
began more or less independently during the 1970's in both the Northeast and the West, two regions influenced by the moralistic political culture. However, different methods of judicial selection prevail in these
two regions. In the Northeast, the most common method of selection is
appointment to the high court by the governor or the legislature or both.
Justices in these states do not face the voters. In the West, especially in
the western states having a strong record of state constitutional rights
litigation, justices are more likely to be elected to the high court27 or
appointed and then required to stand before the electorate to retain their
seat.2 8
Considering the actual number of independent state constitutional
rights decisions rendered by courts in the two regions, state constitutional law litigation appears to have diffused earlier 29 in the West than in
the Northeast. That is, contrary to expectations, justices in western moralistic states who are linked to voters either by direct election or retention
elections have been among the leaders in developing state constitutional
rights law. By contrast, diffusion in the Northeast appears to have increased after 1980. Since justices in the Northeast are more likely to
have been appointed to the state high court, appointed respondents were
more likely than other respondents to report a significant increase in
state constitutional law litigation in individual rights cases since 1980.
At the same time, elected respondents were slightly more likely than
other respondents to report that state constitutional claims are raised
with greater frequency than federal constitutional claims in individual
rights cases. In Table 5, then, there is the same kind of U-shape pattern
as in Table 3, except that one leg of the U in Table 5 is, in effect, much
shorter than the other because the "Elect" column includes most respondents from the South where justices in most of those states are elected to
the state high court.
27. E.g., Oregon and Washington.
28. E.g., California.
29. Before 1980.

Summer 1986]

IIM.

STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION

Criminal and Noncriminal Rights Cases

Approximately three-quarters30 of the respondents reported that
state constitutional claims are raised most frequently in criminal justice
cases. Only fourteen percent reported that such claims are raised most
frequently in noncriminal rights cases, and merely eleven percent reported no difference in the frequency with which state constitutional
claims are raised in criminal and noncriminal rights cases.
The data displayed in Table 6 also show that state constitutional
claims are more likely to be raised in criminal justice cases than in noncriminal rights cases.3" Slightly more than half of the respondents reported that state constitutional claims are raised in less than a quarter of
the criminal justice cases brought before their courts; however, more
than three-fourths of the respondents reported that state constitutional
claims are raised in less than twenty-five percent of the noncriminal
rights cases brought before their courts.
TABLE 6
Perceptions of Frequency of State Constitutional Rights Claims
Percent
Frequency
100-75
74-50
49-25
24-0
Total

Criminal Cases
Percent
Number
10
21
18
52
100

6
13
11
33
63

Noncriminal Cases
Percent
Number
2
10
13
76
100

1
6
8
48
63

Apparently, though, the frequency with which such claims are made
is not always a measure of the importance of the state constitutional law
claims which are raised. According to a respondent from the Supreme
Court of Hawaii:
There is no doubt that since at least the early 1970's, state constitutional law has played a significant role in appellate case law in Hawaii. Although I would estimate that less than twenty-five percent
of our total number of appellate cases involve state constitutional
questions, many of the really significant cases do include such
questions. This is particularly true in criminal cases, where this
court in certain instances has interpreted a state constitutional provision more broadly than a counterpart federal provision. In civil
cases too, this court and many attorneys before it are aware that
30. Seventy-five percent.
31. Cf State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986) (noting the opposite).
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state constitutional provisions must not be ignored.3 2

IV.

Responses to State Constitutional Claims Not Raised in
Lower Courts

Justices were asked if a majority of the members of their court favors a particular course of action in cases where a litigant has failed to
raise a state constitutional claim in lower court proceedings.33 Slightly
more than half of the respondents reported a "yes" response; another
forty-four percent reported a "don't know" response. Interestingly, justices from the West were the least likely to report that a majority on their
court favors a particular response: thirty-eight percent compared to
sixty-four percent of the justices from the Midwest, sixty percent from
the Northeast, and fifty-eight percent from the South. Moreover, justices
from the West were the most likely to report a "don't know" response.
The justices were asked (1) whether they themselves favor a particular course of action in cases in which a litigant has failed to raise a state
constitutional claim in lower court proceedings, and (2) whether a particular course of action is generally followed by their court in such cases.3 4
Overall, the data displayed in Table 7 show that fifty-six percent of the
justices favor the idea of declining to hear the claim. Fully seventy-seven
percent of the justices reported that their court does in fact decline to
hear the claim. If a claim is to be considered, the most favored and followed procedure is to ask counsel to prepare supplemental briefs. There
is only minimal support for having a claim raised sua sponte, and virtually no support for the idea of remanding such a case to lower court for
additional argument.
32. When the identity of a justice is not given for a quote, the respondent wished to remain anonymous.
33. See, e.g., State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233 (Vt. 1985):
The state constitutional issue has been squarely raised but neither party has
presented any substantive analysis or argument on this issue. This constitutes inadequate briefing .... Because the briefs fall short of the mark on the state constitutional claim, we are directing the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing the
issue.
Id. at 234. "To protect his or her client, it is the duty of the advocate to raise state constitutional issues, where appropriate, at the trial level and to diligently develop and plausibly maintain them on appeal." Id. at 238. See also, supra note 14.
34. The responses provided were (1) ask counsel to prepare supplemental briefs, (2) decline to hear the claim, (3) remand to a lower court for additional argument, and (4) raise the
claim sua sponte.
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TABLE 7
Opinions and Perceptions of Court Responses to State Constitutional
Claims Not Raised in Lower Courts

Response

Favorb
Chief Associate
Justice
Justice

Followc
Chief Associate
Justice
Justice

Total
Favorb

Followc

Decline to
hear claim
63
47
79
77
56
78
Request
supplemental briefs
24
30
11
18
27
13
Raise claim
sua sponte
13
17
11
6
15
9
Remand to
lower court
for
additional
argument
0
7
0
0
3
0
Total
number
38
30
28
17
68
45
a Multiple responses were given by a few respondents.
b Respondents who favor a particular response.
c Respondents who reported that their court generally follows a particular
response.
There are, however, some interesting variations in responses. Consistent with several other findings from this survey, chief justices were
more likely than associate justices to favor the idea of declining to hear a
claim that was not raised in lower court proceedings. The chief and associate justices agreed, though, that their courts generally decline to hear
such a claim. Regionally, justices from the West were more likely to
favor the idea of asking counsel to prepare supplemental briefs: forty-two
percent as opposed to twenty-five percent of the respondents from the
Midwest, twenty percent from the South, and only thirteen percent from
the Northeast. Justices from the Northeast were the most likely to favor
the idea of declining to hear a claim: seventy-five percent as opposed to
sixty-seven percent of the respondents from the Midwest, fifty percent
from the South, and forty-two percent from the West. In terms of political culture, justices from traditionalistic states were the least likely to
favor the idea of declining to hear a claim: thirty-three percent as opposed to seventy percent of the respondents from moralistic states and
sixty-five percent from individualistic states. Justices from traditionalistic states were, thus, the most likely to favor the ideas of asking counsel
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to prepare supplemental briefs,3 raising the claim sua sponte,36 and remanding the case to lower court for additional argument.3 7
What may underlie and link the comparatively high levels of support among respondents from the West and traditionalistic states for
raising a state constitutional claim sua sponte and remanding a case to a
lower court for additional arguments is the predominantly traditionalistic political culture of much of the so-called Sun Belt.38 That is, eighty
percent of the respondents who favor these two courses of action sit on
courts in a band of Sun Belt states stretching from Florida to Arizona.
Similarly, though less decisively, thirty-five percent of the respondents
who favor the idea of asking counsel to prepare supplemental briefs come
from Sun Belt states, while another thirty-five percent come from states
in the Northwest, including Alaska. Only eighteen percent come from
the Midwest, and twelve percent from the Northeast. Consequently, justices from the West and from traditionalistic states were the least likely
to favor the idea of declining to hear a claim.
These results suggest that a large proportion 9 of justices who sit on
courts in traditionalistic states favor the idea of raising state constitutional claims in individual rights cases even though very few such claims
are raised before their courts. However, a certain caution is in order.
Response rates were lower for these questions than for other questions, in
part, because many courts have rules that preclude one or more courses
of action. In some jurisdictions, issues not raised in lower court are
waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Some courts are
limited to reviewing assigned errors. Several justices reported that
courses of action depend upon the particular case. A number of justices
therefore refrained from expressing an opinion on a favored course of
action, and some others simply checked "decline to hear the claim."
V.

Teaching State Constitutional Law

In most law schools, the contents of courses on constitutional law
and individual rights are limited almost entirely to federal constitutional
law. 4° This is one reason, perhaps an important reason, why state consti35. Twenty-nine percent.
36. Twenty-four percent compared to fifteen percent for the entire sample.
37. Fourteen percent compared to three percent for the entire sample.
38. The Sun Belt encompasses the warm-weather states of the South and Southwest.
39. Sixty-seven percent. See supra note 38 and infra note 42 and accompanying text.
40. Leading constitutional case books of the day, though otherwise thorough, make little
mention of state constitutional law developments. See, e.g., G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (11th ed. 1985) (includes a few references to articles); W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR, J.
CHOPER & S. SHIFFRIN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (6th ed. 1986) (does include at least one case
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tutional claims are not raised with greater frequency before most state
high courts. Neither the justices who serve on the courts nor the attorneys who appear before those courts are likely to have learned much
about state constitutional law in law school.4 1 There is no major current
textbook on state constitutional rights law, nor is there a general constitutional law casebook containing any significant discussion of state constitutional law. Charles G. Douglas, a former justice of the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire, made these same points quite strongly in 1978:
The fact that law clerks working for state judges have only been
taught or are familiar withfederal cases brings a federal bias to the
various states as they fan out after graduation from "federally" oriented law schools. The lack of treatises [or] textbooks developing
the rich diversity of state constitutional law... could be viewed as
an attempt to "nationalize" the law and denigrate the state
bench.4 2
Nevertheless, in recent years, there has been a growing awareness of
rights provisions in state constitutions among judges and attorneys in
many states. As Justice Clifford F. Brown of the Supreme Court of Ohio
commented on the survey: "Lawyers on appellate review have recently
become more conscious about raising state constitutional issues, in addition to federal constitutional issues, and about the significance and consequences of doing so." In light of this growing awareness, as well as the
growing number of rights cases decided on state constitutional law
grounds, how do justices of the state high courts feel about teaching state
constitutional law in law schools and about testing for state constitutional law on bar examinations?
The data displayed in Table 8 show that slightly more than twothirds of the responding justices favor the idea of testing for knowledge of
and several citations); P. BREST & S. LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 1983) (includes references to several cases and
excerpts from a few articles); G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1986) (little or no references). College texts on civil liberties give even less
attention to state constitutional law. The most scholarly recent text on all aspects of American Constitutionalism is W. MURPHY, J. FLEMING & W. HARRIS, III, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION INTERPRETATION (1986) (no section on state constitutional law and makes only passing
references). W. COHEN & J. KAPLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND INDI-

(2d ed. 1982), R. CUSHMAN, CASES IN CIVIL LIBERTIES (5th ed. 1985) and
M.G. ABERNATHY, CIVIL LIBERTIES UNDER THE CONSTITUTION (4th ed. 1985), do not treat
the subject at all. See also C.H. PRITCHETr, CONSTITUTIONAL CIVIL LIBERTIES (1984); L.
BARKER & T. BARKER, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION (4th ed. 1982) (passing
VIDUAL RIGHTS

references and note of a few cases).
41. See Collins, Looking to the States, NAT'L L. J., Sept. 29, 1986 (Special Supplement), at
2.
42. Douglas, State JudicialActivism-The New Role for States' Bills of Rights, 12 SuFFOLK U.L. REv. 1123, 1147 (1978) (emphasis in original).
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state constitutional law on bar examinations. Interestingly, however, far
fewer justices4 3 favor the idea of offering state constitutional law as a
required course in law school. On this question, moreover, slightly more
than one-quarter of the justices expressed "no opinion." Instead, those
state court justices surveyed favor the idea of including state constitutional law materials in the standard constitutional law course and of
offering state constitutional law as an elective course in law school.4 5
Nearly three-quarters of the responding justices also prefer the idea of
including state constitutional law materials in the standard constitutional
law course offered to undergraduates.
TABLE 8
Opinions About Teaching State Constitutional Law
Percent of Respondentsa
Response
A
B
C
D
E
Favor
69
39
81
85
75
Do not favor
15
34
7
7
5
No opinion
16
26
12
8
20
Total number
61
61
57
61
59
Respondents were asked if they favored, did not favor, or had no
opinion about:
A: Testing state constitutional law on the bar examination.
B: Offering state constitutional law as a required course in law
school.
C: Offering state constitutional law as an elective course in law
school.
D: Including state constitutional law materials in the standard
constitutional law course.
E: Including state constitutional law materials in the standard
constitutional law course offered to undergraduates.
As one might expect, respondents who reported a moderate-to-significant increase in the number of individual rights cases litigated under
their state constitutions since 1980, and respondents who reported that
state constitutional claims are raised in fifty percent or more of the criminal justice cases brought before their courts, were more likely than other
respondents to favor (1) testing for knowledge of state constitutional law
on bar examinations, (2) offering state constitutional law as a required
course in law school, (3) including state constitutional law materials in
43. Thirty-nine percent.
44. Eighty-five percent.
45. Eighty-one percent.
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the standard constitutional law course, and (4) including state constitutional law materials in the standard constitutional law course offered to
undergraduates.
Associate justices were much more likely than chief justices to favor
the testing of state constitutional law on bar examinations and of requiring a course on state constitutional law in law school. Indeed, most of
the justices who have come to46be regarded as pioneers in this field are, or
have been, associate justices.
In most cases, responses to the questions about the teaching and
testing of state constitutional law varied with region and political culture
in much the same, but weaker, manner as the findings reported earlier.
The large proportion of favorable responses to four of the five items
served to weaken regional and political cultural differences. Justices
from the Northeast and West and justices from moralistic states were
slightly more likely than other justices to favor all of the ideas concerning
the teaching and testing of state constitutional law except, however, the
idea of requiring a state constitutional law course in law school. In this
case, fifty-three percent of the justices from traditionalistic states reported that they favor a state constitutional law course requirement.
Only thirty-five percent of the justices from moralistic states and thirtytwo percent of the justices from individualistic states favor such a requirement. The difference is not great, but it is odd, considering the
comparatively low level of state constitutional law litigation in traditionalistic states. Perhaps the responses from justices in the traditionalistic
states reflect a memory and a hope: a memory of the days of states'
rights when state constitutions were not so overshadowed by the United
States Constitution, and a hope that state constitutions will again become
more important. Traditionalistic states of the old Confederacy are also
among those states that have ordinarily required the teaching of the state
constitution to high school and college students.4 7
Conclusion
There has been a notable increase in the number of individual rights
cases litigated under state constitutions since 1980. No state high court
46. E.g., Shirley S. Abrahamson of Wisconsin, Edward F. Hennessey of Massachusetts (as
associate justice then chief justice), William C. Hill of Vermont, Hans A. Linde of Oregon,
Stanley Mosk of California, Steward G. Pollock of New Jersey, Samuel J. Roberts of Pennsylvania (as associate justice then chief justice), and Robert F. Utter of Washington (as associate justice then chief justice).
47. One respondent, Justice Harry C. Martin of the Supreme Court of North Carolina,

noted that he planned to teach a course on state constitutional law at the University of North
Carolina Law School during the summer of 1986.
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justice reported a decrease in such ligitation. Increases have been most
evident in the Northeast and West and in states having a moralistic political culture, although among the moralistic states, justices on courts for
which the method of selection is appointment were more likely than
other respondents to report a significant increase in the number of individual rights cases litigated under their state constitution since 1980.
At the same time, in most states, state constitutional claims are
raised less frequently than federal constitutional claims in individual
rights cases. State constitutional claims are most likely to be raised in
criminal justice cases. Such claims appear to be raised with the greatest
frequency before high courts in the West and in states having a moralistic
political culture. Where state constitutional claims are not raised in
lower court proceedings, however, the majority of justices prefer to decline to hear a claim raised before the high court, and more than threequarters of the courts do decline to hear such claims. Only in the traditionalistic states do most justices4" favor a procedure for hearing such a
claim.
Large majorities of justices favor the ideas of testing for knowledge
of state constitutional law on bar examinations and of giving greater attention to state constitutional law in law schools and in undergraduate
education. However, only slightly more than a third favolr a required
separate course in state constitutional law for law students, compared to
slightly more than half of the justices from traditionalistic states.
This latter response could reflect a certain tentativeness on the part
of some state high court justices. In fact, a tone of tentativeness seemed
to underlie a notable number of the survey responses, suggesting that
there has been a guarded judicial response to the current enthusiasm with
state constitutional law. State constitutional claims are hardly ever
raised in some states, and where they are raised, many justices appear to
approach them with caution and, perhaps in some cases, even reluctance.
We cannot say precisely why state constitutional claims in individual rights cases are raised with greater frequency in some states than in
other states. There are, however, a number of possible factors. First,
litigation premised upon state constitutional claims may arise when one
or more justices on a court hold an independent view of the role of the
court, one that encourages the justices to look to state law as an analytically separate basis for deciding rights cases. For example, Justice Wallace P. Carson of the Supreme Court of Oregon noted: "Inrecent years,
the bench and bar of this state have paid considerably more attention to
48. Approximately two-thirds.
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state constitutional issues. This increase in interest is primarily traceable
to the scholarly efforts of my colleague, Associate Justice Hans Linde."
Second, given the regional patterns evident in the survey responses, there
also appears to be a diffusion factor. Justices pay attention to decisions
rendered by high courts in neighboring or nearby states.4 9 Third, there
appears to be a political culture factor, which may influence many facets
of state constitutional rights litigation, from the very nature and contents
of the state constitution itself to public and legal conceptions of the
proper roles of the state high court. Lastly, a number of interest groups,
such as the American Civil Liberties Union and the National Rifle Association, have raised state constitutional claims out of a realization that
what they may not be able to secure from the United States Supreme
Court under the United States Constitution may sometimes be secured
from a state supreme court under its state constitution.
A new constitution, an overall revision of a constitution, or a major
amendment to a constitution may also affect the nature of litigation. For
example, Chief Justice J. A. Turnage of Montana reported: "Montana
adopted a broad revision of its Constitution in 1972; the court has been
called upon numerous times to interpret and apply its provisions. The
Bench and Bar of Montana should be encouraged to develop the State
Constitution on an independent basis." A justice from the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania said:
Since the individual rights guaranteed by Article I of the Pennsylvania Constitution are generally the same as those guaranteed
under the federal Constitution, state constitutional claims are often
not raised specifically. The Pennsylvania Constitution does, however, contain an "equal rights" amendment which is raised in support of civil claims more frequently than federal statutes.
Massachusetts, perhaps, is in a class by itself. Chief Justice Edward F.
Hennessey of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, the state
with the nation's oldest written constitution still in effect today, reported
that: "The Court is guided by the knowledge that the Massachusetts
Constitution of 1780 has served as a model for the United States Constitution and for those of many states."
Considering the near absence of state constitutional rights litigation
during the 1950's and 1960's, the rise of such litigation since 1970 might
be seen as "revolutionary." So thoroughly did federal constitutional law
come to dominate the rights field during the Warren Court era that a
turn to state constitutional rights litigation appeared to be remote, if not
49. See PORTER & TARR,
(1982).
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out of the question, by the late 1960's. However, considering the current
level of state constitutional rights litigation in most states, one cannot yet
speak of a "revolution." The trend clearly appears to be upward, toward
an increase in state constitutional rights litigation. Furthermore, with
additional changes in the composition of the United States Supreme
Court, coupled with greater dissemination of information about state
constitutional law, the trend may accelerate upward during the late
1980's and into the 1990's.50 There is already a comparatively high level
of state constitutional rights litigation in the moralistic states, with California and the upper West apparently having the greatest activity and the
Northeast following close behind. Significant increases in such litigation
in the individualistic states can probably be expected as well, especially if
a more rights-restrictive United States Supreme Court precipitates renewed "interest group" conflict over rights issues.
A major question, though, is both the future and the direction of
state constitutional rights litigation in the traditionalistic states and in
those moralistic states where justices are either elected directly to the
high court or required to stand for some type of retention election. There
is comparatively little state constitutional rights litigation in the traditionalistic states, yet justices in those states certainly express an interest
in hearing state constitutional rights claims and in seeing state constitutional law taught in law schools. While there is a comparatively high
level of state constitutional rights litigation in the moralistic states, high
court elections in some western states may be becoming more contentious, in part because of public conflict over rights issues. For example,
Justice Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court, the nation's second leading
court in terms of the number of actual state constitutional rights-affirming decisions rendered, recently prevailed in an unusually spirited
election in which his positions on state constitutional rights questions
were an issue. 51 Otto Kaus, a former justice of the Supreme Court of
California, complained, upon announcing his retirement, of increasing
politicization of the California court: "You cannot forget that you have
a crocodile in your bathtub. You keep wondering whether you're letting
yourself be influenced, and you don't know."52 Chief Justice Rose Bird
of California faces a fierce retention election contest in 1986 in which her
50. Methodological and systematic approaches to state constitutional decisionmaking
could also have a significant effect on the trend. See Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions:
Some Random Thoughts, 54 Miss. L.J. 371, 389-408 (1984).
51. Although challenged by a sitting trial judge and a local prosecutor, Justice Linde
ultimately won re-election with sixty-two percent of the votes.
52. Quoted in Morain, Kaus to Retire from State Supreme Court, L.A. Times, July 2,
1985, § I, at 1, col. 2.
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positions on capital punishment and other rights questions are among the
leading issues. 3 The upward trend in state constitutional rights litigation and decisionmaking could also be effected by voter approval of constitutional initiatives and constitutional amendments designed to
override high court decisions. 4
In light of these and other factors, then, we cannot be certain at this
time as to where, when, or if the upward trend will change, or what the
outcome of future activity will mean for the protection of individual
rights and the nature of judicial federalism in the United States. It does,
however, appear likely that the upward trend will continue for the foreseeable future.

53. It is unclear, however, as to how much, if any, of the campaign to unseat Chief Justice
Bird can be attributed to her state constitutional rights decisions. (Chief Justice Bird won her
first retention election in 1977 with only fifty-two percent of the votes. She was then the target
of an impeachment campaign, and current polls suggest that she may lose her 1986 election).
Justice Stanley Mosk, a leading advocate of reliance on state constitutions, was also up for
election in November 1986, but faced little or no opposition. See Hager, Mosk Will Seek New
Court Term, L.A. Times, Aug. 12, 1986, § 1, at I, col. 5.
54. See, e.g., Wilkes, First Things Last: Amendomania and State Bills of Rights, 54 Miss.
L.J. 223-59 (1984); Collins, Attacks on Roe v. Wade Decision Hot Ballot Topic this November,
NAT'L L.J., Sept. 22, 1986, at 22; Collins, The 'New Federalism'is Thriving Despite Setbacks &
Losses in 1984, NAT'L L. J., Apr. 29, 1985, at 32.

